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Modulation of impulsivity and reward sensitivity in intertemporal choice by striatal and midbrain dopamine synthesis in healthy adults

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THE TENDENCY TO DISCOUNT delayed rewards, described variously as delay discounting (DD) or temporal discounting, is ubiquitous in the animal kingdom (Mazur 1987; Rachlin 2000). While some degree of DD is typical among healthy humans, a strong bias toward selecting immediate over larger delayed rewards, or “Now bias,” is associated with multiple clinical conditions, including substance abuse (Becker and Murphy 1988; Reynolds 2006), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Barkley et al. 2001; Paloyelis et al. 2010; Sonuga-Barke et al. 2008), and pathological gambling (Alessi and Petry 2003; Leeman and Potenza 2012). These clinical associations have helped to spark interest in understanding the neurobiology of such Now bias.

Data from humans and animals indicate that Now bias is highly heritable (Anokhin et al. 2011; Mitchell 2011). However, work in animals also indicates that Now bias can be pharmacologically modulated, particularly by dopamine (DA) (Dalley et al. 2008; Doya 2008; Winstanley 2011). Converging evidence also suggests the importance of frontal DA in regulating Now bias in humans. First, the Val158Met polymorphism (rs4680) in the gene encoding the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) enzyme, which regulates tonic frontal DA (Gogos et al. 1998; Kaenmaki et al. 2010; Karoum et al. 1994; Slifstein et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2012), predicts Now bias, with putatively lower tonic frontal DA being associated with greater Now bias among adults (Boettiger et al. 2007; Smith and Boettiger 2012). Moreover, COMT inhibition reduces Now bias (Kayser et al. 2012), and COMT genotype predicts the effects of acute changes in DA signaling on Now bias, according to a U-shaped model, with both low and high DA extremes predicting greater Now bias (Kelm and Boettiger 2013; Smith et al. 2014).

Striatal DA is also implicated in regulating Now bias by the clinical finding that patients with Parkinson’s disease discount delayed rewards more heavily than age-matched control subjects do (Milenkova et al. 2011), particularly those with impulse control disorders (Housden et al. 2010), as well as by genetic studies (Eisenberg et al. 2007; Paloyelis et al. 2010) and by pharmacological manipulations that heavily modulate subcortical DA in humans (Acheson and de Wit 2008; de Wit 2009; de Wit et al. 2002; Hamidovic et al. 2008; Pine et al. 2010). Most of these pharmacology studies to date have produced inconsistent results, however, perhaps due to unaccounted for intrinsic variations in DA signaling (e.g., genetic or developmental) that could interact with pharmacological effects.

A recent positron emission tomography (PET) study of a sample of adult men with ADHD, some with comorbid cocaine dependence, found that DA transporter (DAT) occupancy by methylphenidate in the putamen, but not the caudate, significantly correlated with decreased Now bias on the drug
(Crunelle et al. 2013). Two more recent reports from primarily clinical samples also support a role for lower subcortical DA being associated with increased Now bias (Ballard et al. 2015; Joutsa et al. 2015), although neither study included substantial numbers of healthy nonsmoking young adults. Notably, the degree to which COMT inhibition decreases synchrony between the putamen and the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) during Now/Later choices predicts how much COMT inhibition decreases Now bias (Kayser et al. 2012). COMT inhibition decreases Now bias more among more impulsive people, who in turn have lower DAT availability in the putamen (Costa et al. 2013) and both diminished midbrain D_{2}/D_{3} autoreceptor binding and elevated amphetamine-induced striatal DA release (Buckholtz et al. 2010). The negative relationship between midbrain D_{2}/D_{3} binding and trait impulsivity predicts that lower midbrain DA signaling may be associated with elevated Now bias, which also correlates with trait impulsivity (Mitchell et al. 2005).

Together, the data above support the idea that variations in subcortical DA also contribute to individual differences in Now bias, but no PET studies to date have investigated this question in a sample including only healthy young adult subjects. We hypothesized that those with relatively lower DA synthesis in the putamen would demonstrate elevated Now bias compared with those with higher putamen DA signaling. Although the supporting evidence is weaker, we also hypothesized that reduced midbrain DA synthesis would be associated with increased Now bias. Moreover, we predicted that such effects would be detected after controlling for effects predicted by COMT genotype. To test these ideas, we quantified subcortical DA synthesis in healthy young adults (ages 24–34 yr; 50% women), using PET with 6-[18F]fluoro-L-tyrosine (FMT) uptake, a stable measure of DA synthesis capacity (DeJesus 2003). In a subsequent session, we measured Now bias with a validated DD task (Mitchell et al. 2005). We also determined COMT genotype for each participant and included COMT genotype as a covariate in our analyses.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Sample characteristics. We invited 33 participants in a previous PET-FMT study at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) to participate in this behavioral study; 16 participants accepted. Participants were neurologically and psychologically normal right-handed volunteers ages 24–34 yr (mean = 28, SD = 2.7; 50% women). Time between the FMT-PET scans and behavioral measurements was an average of 2.3 yr (SD = 1.1, range = 1.0–4.2 yr), similar to the elapsed time in previous studies measuring FMT uptake (Cools et al. 2009). Moreover, previous work has shown that binding potential (K_{i}) measures of presynaptic DA synthesis in the striatum are quite stable: within individual healthy subjects over a 7-yr span, the probability of K_{i} remaining within 18% of its original value is >95% (Vingerhoets et al. 1994). All participants gave written informed consent and were paid for participation, as approved by the UCB Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.

COMT genotyping. We collected blood samples from participants, which were stored at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) DNA Bank and genotyped for the COMT Val^{158}Met polymorphism (rs4680) by the UCSF Genetics Core Facility (Lachman et al. 1996). COMT genotype was not available for one participant. COMT genotype distribution for the remaining 15 participants was 5 Met/Met, 6 Met/Val, and 4 Val/Val; this distribution did not differ from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (χ^{2} = 0.58, df = 1, P = 0.447).

Delay discounting task. Intertemporal choice behavior was assessed with a DD task described in detail previously (Fig. 1) (Altamirano et al. 2011; Kelm and Boettiger 2013; Smith et al. 2014). Subjects were given task instructions, completed a short practice, and then completed 8 blocks of 42 trials each. Subjects made a series of choices between smaller, sooner ("Now") and larger, later ("Later") hypothetical monetary rewards. Each trial began with an instruction cue, followed by two options. In each trial, the Later option was one of five amounts ($2, $5, $10, $20, or $100) available at one of five future delays (1 wk, 2 wk, 1 mo, 3 mo, or 6 mo), while the Now option amount was discounted from the Later amount by 5%, 10%, 15%, or 30%, and available "TODAY." The instruction cue indicated one of four trial types: WANT, DON'T WANT, SOONER, and LARGER (Fig. 1A); we consider the latter two conditions together as control (CON) trials. Reaction time (RT) is defined as the time between the point when the two options appeared and the time at which the participants indicated their choice. Accuracy in these CON trials verifies adherence to task instructions, and comparison of RT between the CON, WANT, and DON'T WANT conditions indicates whether additional cognitive processes are engaged in the WANT and DON'T WANT conditions, relative to the simple objective comparison in CON trials. Participants who fail to demonstrate sufficient accuracy in the CON condition trials or who fail to demonstrate longer RTs in the WANT relative to the CON condition are excluded. In this study, all participants met inclusion criteria for CON trial accuracy (mean: 96.9 ± 0.7%) and WANT-CON RT difference (mean: 475 ± 56 ms). Trial types were pseudorandomly ordered and weighted, with one-half WANT trials and one-sixth each of the other trial types. The WANT condition was most frequent because choice in that condition was our primary interest. Moreover, this weighting also promotes a prepotent tendency to select the preferred option, requiring inhibition in the DON'T WANT condition. Participants indicated their preferred option on WANT trials, their nonpreferred option on DON'T WANT trials, and the side with the sooner time or larger amount of money for SOONER and LARGER (CON) trials, respectively. The Later amount, delay time, percent discount, and left/right position (50/50) were pseudorandomly selected for each trial. We also collected the RT for each response. All subjects demonstrated the expected RT pattern across trial types (see above).

Behavioral data analyses. Our primary index of Now bias was the proportion of Now choices in the WANT condition, termed the impulsive choice ratio (ICR). We also examined ICR as a function of the delay time, estimated a logarithmic fit, and calculated the intercept and slope of the fit, which indicate impulsivity and sensitivity of discounting to increasing delay, respectively. We also determined the inferred ICR (iICR) from the DON'T WANT trials, as a function of delay time, calculating the average of the absolute difference between ICR and iICR at each delay. This value provides a measure of response control, with larger values indicating less controlled response selection (Mitchell et al. 2007). We also calculated the criterion interest rate acceptance threshold for each subject, which translates participant choices into an intuitive "real-world" approximation (Mitchell et al. 2007). To do so, we first calculated the simple interest rate for each trial according to the following equation:

\[ \text{Interest Rate} = \frac{(\text{Amount}_{\text{Later}} - \text{Amount}_{\text{Sooner}})}{(\text{Amount}_{\text{Sooner}} \times \text{Delay Time})} \]  

(1)

We then plotted the percentage of trials in which the subject accepted the Later option against the interest rate and fitted the data with a logistic regression of the following form:

\[ y = \frac{e^{(a + b \cdot X)}}{1 + e^{(a + b \cdot X)}} \]  

(2)

Given the two-alternative forced-choice structure of our task design, we defined the interest rate criterion acceptance threshold (from the logistic fit) as the interest rate for which the subject chose the Later option 75% of the time. The criterion interest rate indicates the
simple interest rate at which the individual is three times more likely to accept the delayed reward than to opt for the immediate reward. For this measure, immediate reward bias would manifest as an unwillingness to wait for delayed rewards characterized by low to moderate interest rates.

In addition to ICR, a model-free choice metric, we also quantified the degree of impulsive choice, using the $q$-exponential discount function based on Tsallis statistics (Takahashi 2009; Takahashi et al. 2008):

$$\text{Discounted Value}(D) = 1/\left[1 + (1 - q)k_qD\right]^{1/(1-q)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $D$ represents delay time and $k_q$ and $q$ are measures of impulsivity and of inconsistency in discount rate across delay times, respectively. To estimate $k_q$ and $q$ for each participant, we performed nonlinear curve fitting of each data set to Eq. 3 with the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm implemented in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA; Curve Fitting Toolbox, Custom Equation option). Discounted value was calculated as the cumulative selected-to-maximum dollar value was calculated as the cumulative selected-to-maximum dollar.

$$\text{DI}_{q}(D) = k_q/(1-q)/\left[1 + k_q(1-q)D\right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

with $D$, $k_q$, and $q$ as defined in Eq. 3. DI quantifies the degree to which $k_q$ changes with increasing delay time, with a rational (exponential) discount rate yielding a DI of zero and a positive DI indicating irrational intertemporal choice associated with immediate vs. delayed reward preference reversal with increasing delay time. We excluded $n = 3$ subjects from these analyses based on an inadequate fit by the $q$-exponential model (defined as an adjusted $R^2$ value $< 0.2$).

**Statistical analysis.** As ICR, $k_q$, $q$, and DI data in this sample were not normally distributed, we employed bootstrapping in unpaired $t$-tests comparing groups to eliminate concerns about violations of parametric assumptions. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were used to test for the effect of group on other DD task measures as well as on arc-sine root transformed ICR values. $COMT$ genotype was included as a covariate in our analyses because of previous data showing $COMT$ genotype effects on ICR (Boettiger et al. 2007; Paloyelis et al. 2010; Smith and Boettiger 2012). As the male-to-female ratio differed significantly between the High (2:6) and Low (6:1) midbrain FMT groups ($\chi^2 = 5.53, P = 0.019$), we also covaried for sex in our midbrain FMT analyses. Note that all reported means thus reflect the covariate adjusted (i.e., estimated marginal) means. Pearson’s $r$ or Spearman’s $r$ with bootstrapping was used for correlation analyses, as indicated, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are reported. Where sphericity was violated, we applied the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.

**PET data acquisition.** PET imaging and FMT synthesis were performed at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; FMT was synthesized as described previously (Van Brocklin et al. 2004). FMT is metabolized by aromatic L-amino acid decarboxylase (AADC), a DA-synthesizing enzyme, the activity of which indexes the ability of dopaminergic neurons to synthesize DA given optimal substrate (DeJesus 2003). FMT is subsequently oxidized to 6-$\text{[18F]}$fluoro-dihydroxyphenylacetic acid, which is detected in PET-FMT scans. Signal intensity on PET-FMT scans thus indicates local DA synthesis capacity (Jordan et al. 1997).

PET scans were acquired with a Siemens ECAT-HR PET camera, as previously described (Landau et al. 2009). Each participant received a bolus injection of ~2.5 mCi of FMT into an antecubital vein. A dynamic acquisition sequence was acquired in 3D mode for a total of 89 min. We reconstructed FMT images with an ordered-subset expectation-maximization algorithm with weighted attenuation, fol-
lowed by scatter correction, and smoothing with a 4-mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM) kernel.

Structural MRI. We acquired two volumetric high-resolution magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition with gradient echo (MPRAGE) T1-weighted anatomical images from each participant on a 1.5 T Siemens Magnetom Avanto MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with a 12-channel head coil (echo time = 3.58 ms; repetition time = 2.120 ms; voxel size = 1.0 mm³, 160 axial slices; field of view = 256 mm; scanning time ≈ 9 min). The two images were averaged to obtain one high-resolution structural image, which was used to generate individual striatal and midbrain regions of interest (ROIs).

Regions of interest. We drew ROIs based on visual inspection of each subject’s mean MPRAGE with FSLview. The dorsal putamen (Fig. 2A), dorsal caudate, and ventral striatum ROIs were drawn according to previously published guidelines (Mawlawi et al. 2001), based on the Mai atlas (Mai et al. 1997). The midbrain ROIs included both ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra and were drawn on five consecutive axial slices, with the most caudal slice being the one in which the frontopontine fibers separated into left and right bundles and the substantia nigra was outlined clearly (Fig. 2B). Intrarater reliability and interrater reliability were both >95%. Following previously published methods, the reference region for calculating PET-FMT values was cerebellar gray matter (Braskie et al. 2008; Cools et al. 2009; Landau et al. 2009). Given the cerebellum’s location posterior and adjacent to the midbrain, and the limited spatial resolution and blurring of PET signal, to avoid contaminating the cerebellar ROI with midbrain FMT signal only the posterior three-fourths of the cerebellum was included in the ROI.

PET data analysis. We reconstructed the FMT images with an ordered-subset expectation-maximization algorithm weighted by attenuation, corrected for scatter, and smoothed with a 4-mm FWHM kernel. We realigned the FMT images to the middle (12th) frame, to correct for movement during scanning using SPM8 (Ashburner et al. 2008; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). We coregistered the mean MPRAGE (and ROIs) to the mean image of all realigned frames in the FMT scan with FSL-FLIRT (version 4.1.2; http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). After coregistration, the ROI masks were thresholded at 0.5, ensuring high tissue probability. To create $K_i$ images representing the amount of tracer accumulated in the ROIs relative to the cerebellar reference region, we used an in-house graphical analysis program implementing Patlak plotting (Logan 2000; Patlak and Blasberg 1985). We extracted average $K_i$ values from the ROIs and computed associations between regional FMT uptake ($K_i$ values) and the behavioral task measures described in RESULTS.

RESULTS

Low FMT $K_i$ in the putamen predicts elevated Now bias. We predicted greater Now bias in those with relatively lower FMT $K_i$ in the putamen, which we first quantified as the ICR (see MATERIALS AND METHODS). Indeed, in comparing the participants with bilateral putamen FMT $K_i$ values below the group median (Low putamen FMT; see Fig. 2A, center, for example) to those above the group median (High putamen FMT; see Fig. 2A, right, for example), we observed significantly higher ICRs in the Low putamen FMT group (median = 0.80) relative to the High putamen FMT group (median = 0.50) in a bootstrapped ANOVA [$F_{(1,12)} = 5.27, P = 0.041, \eta^2 = 0.27$; Fig. 3A]. Notably, we also observed a negative correlation between putamen FMT $K_i$ values and ICR (after partialing out COMT genotype effects): $r = -0.513$ (95% CI: $-0.169, -0.807$), $P = 0.060$. We next examined ICR as a function of the delay time (Fig. 3B). A mixed-effects $2 \times 5$ ANOVA found significant main effects of both group [$F_{(1,12)} = 6.28, P = 0.028$] and delay time [$F_{(4,48)} = 4.90, P = 0.002$] but no significant putamen FMT $\times$ delay interaction [$F_{(4,48)} = 0.38, P = 0.821$]. Direct comparison of the slope and intercept terms of the logarithmic fit to each subject’s ICR as a function of delayed reward delay time found significant effects of putamen FMT on the intercept [$F_{(1,12)} = 8.38, P = 0.013$] but not the slope [$F_{(1,12)} = 0.49, P = 0.50$]. The intercept differences indicate more impulsive choice in the Low putamen FMT group, while the lack of difference between slopes indicates that the sensitivity of discounting to increasing delay is similar between groups (Mitchell et al. 2005). Now bias also varied as a function of the delayed reward amount (Fig. 3C). A $2 \times 5$ mixed-effects ANOVA found significant main effects of both...
putamen FMT \[F_{(1,12)} = 6.39, P = 0.026\] and Later amount \[F_{(4,48)} = 3.25, P = 0.019\] but no significant putamen FMT \(\times\) amount interaction \[F_{(4,48)} = 0.41, P = 0.80\]. Direct comparison of the slope and intercept terms of the logarithmic fit to each subject’s ICR by reward magnitude data found no significant group difference in either the average slope [Low putamen FMT: mean = \(-0.27 \pm 0.17\); High putamen FMT: mean = \(-0.22 \pm 0.20\); \(t_{(14)} = -0.55, P = 0.59\)] or intercept [Low putamen FMT: mean = 0.95 \(\pm\) 0.38; High putamen FMT: mean = 0.66 \(\pm\) 0.34; \(t_{(14)} = 1.58, P = 0.136\)]. Finally, we tested whether putamen FMT \(K_q\) values impacted subjects’ criterion interest rate acceptance threshold (Mitchell et al. 2007), a metric that strongly covaries with ICR [Spearman’s \(\rho = 0.776\) (95% CI: 0.399, 0.989); \(P < 0.001\)] but more intuitively translates to “real-life” decision making. We found a significant and very large main effect of putamen FMT on the interest rate criterion threshold [Fig. 4; \(F_{(1,12)} = 12.44, P = 0.004, \eta^2 = 0.481\)], with the High putamen FMT group being willing to accept delayed rewards at significantly lower interest rates (Low putamen FMT: 21.13 \(\pm\) 9.29%; High putamen FMT: 2.60 \(\pm\) 9.08%). We also observed a negative correlation between putamen FMT \(K_q\) values and criterion interest rate (after partialing out \textit{COMT} genotype effects): \(r = -0.592\) (95% CI: \(-0.355, -0.822\)), \(P = 0.026\).

This \textit{Now/Later} task includes objective choice CON trials; accuracy in these trials did not differ significantly between the Low putamen FMT and High putamen FMT groups \(F_{(1,12)} = 1.28, P = 0.28\). The task also includes a control condition (DON’T WANT) in which participants are instructed to select the monetary reward option that they do not prefer. Comparing ICR in the WANT trials to \(\text{iICR}\) in the DON’T WANT trials provides a measure of response consistency. We did not detect a significant effect of putamen FMT on this measure of response consistency [see MATERIALS AND METHODS; \(F_{(1,12)} = 0.06, P = 0.81\)]. These results indicate that a difference in response consistency cannot explain the elevated \textit{Now} bias observed in the Low putamen FMT group. We also observed no putamen FMT group effects on RT in the objective choice (CON) trials \([F_{(1,12)} = 3.21, P = 0.10]\), subjective choice (WANT) \([F_{(1,12)} = 0.71, P = 0.42]\), or DON’T WANT \([F_{(1,12)} = 0.41, P = 0.53]\) trials.

As a measure of \textit{Now} bias, ICR has several advantages. The first is its strong internal reliability, as indicated by the Cronbach’s \(\alpha\) for ICR in the present data set, which ranged between 0.96 and 0.98 across participants. The second is that ICR is an assumption-free metric, making it more robust than model-based metrics. In contrast, discounting rates \((k)\) derived via curve-fitting using discounting models depend strongly on both the particular model’s assumptions and the variability of the underlying data to be fit. Despite these caveats, recent studies have demonstrated the utility of the \(q\)-exponential discount function in parameterizing both \textit{Now} bias (impulsivity; \(k_q\)) and the inconsistency \((g)\) in such \textit{Now} bias across delay times in intertemporal choice tasks (Smith et al. 2014; Takahashi 2009; Takahashi et al. 2008). Consistent with our ICR-based results, we found that lower FMT signal in the putamen predicted a significantly larger \(k_q\) value, relative to those with higher FMT signal in the putamen \([F_{(1,9)} = 10.59, P = 0.01]\). To reduce skew in the \(k_q\) distribution of values, we applied a \(\log_{10}\) transformation to the \(k_q\) values prior to parametric analyses, with less negative \(\log_{10}\) \(k_q\) values indicating more impulsive intertemporal choice at delay \(D = 0\). We found significant differences between groups, indicating more impulsive choice at delay \(D = 0\) in low putamen FMT individuals (Fig. 5A; Low putamen FMT \(\log_{10}k_q\): \(-1.94 \pm 0.71\), High putamen FMT \(\log_{10}k_q\): \(-3.39 \pm 0.69\)). In contrast, we did not observe a
significant difference in \( q \) between Low and High putamen FMT groups [Fig. 5B; \( F_{(1,9)} = 1.93, P = 0.198 \)]. Not surprisingly, given these findings, \( k_q \) was strongly correlated with ICR [Spearman’s \( \rho = 0.912 \) (95% CI: 0.666, 0.983), \( P < 0.001 \)], while the correlation between ICR and \( q \) was not significant [Spearman’s \( \rho = -0.220 \) (95% CI: \(-0.752, 0.448\)), \( P = 0.471 \)]. In addition, we quantified the time decay of the discount rate \( (k_q) \) across delay times using Prelec’s (2004) measure of “decreasing impatience” (DI), which quantifies the degree to which \( k_q \) changes with increasing delay time, as implemented within the \( q \)-exponential discount function by Takahashi (2011). A rational (exponential) discount rate yields a DI of zero, while DI is positive for irrational intertemporal choice associated with preference reversal over increasing delay time. A repeated-measures ANOVA [putamen FMT (High/Low) \( \times \) delay time] found significant main effects of both putamen FMT [\( F_{(1,9)} = 8.71, P = 0.016, \eta^2 = 0.20 \)] and delay time [\( F_{(4,36)} = 15.54, P < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.41 \)] and a significant interaction between putamen FMT and delay time [\( F_{(4,36)} = 7.35, P < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.21 \); Fig. 6]. Average DI\(_q\) across delay times was higher in the Low putamen FMT group [mean = 0.031; 95% CI: 0.017, 0.046] vs. the High putamen FMT group [mean = 0.013, 95% CI: 0.003, 0.027; \( F_{(1,9)} = 8.71, P = 0.016 \)]. We confirmed the effect of delay time on DI\(_q\) with a Friedman’s test on DI\(_q\) across delay times (\( \chi^2 = 52, P = 0.001, \text{df} = 4 \)). Post hoc comparisons of DI\(_q\) between groups at each delay time showed significantly higher DI\(_q\) values associated with lower putamen FMT at all five delays [mean differences (bootstrapped): 7 days: 0.077, \( F = 7.74, P = 0.021 \); 14 days: 0.042, \( F = 8.82, P = 0.016 \); 30 days: 0.020, \( F = 9.34, P = 0.014 \); 60 days: 0.007, \( F = 8.17, P = 0.019 \); 180 days: 0.003, \( F = 6.87, P = 0.028 \)]. These data indicate that lower FMT signal in the putamen predicts greater irrationality of intertemporal choice, with the greatest effects at the shortest delay and diminishing with increasing delay times.

Low midbrain FMT \( K_i \) predicts enhanced sensitivity of Now bias to increased delayed reward amount. We also predicted greater Now bias (quantified as ICR) in those with relatively lower FMT \( K_i \) in the midbrain. However, in comparing the participants with midbrain FMT \( K_i \) values below the group median (Low midbrain FMT) to those above the group median (High midbrain FMT), we observed no significant difference in ICR in the Low midbrain FMT group (median = 0.534) relative to the High midbrain FMT group (median = 0.566) in a bootstrapped ANOVA [\( F_{(1,11)} = 0.12, P = 0.738, \eta^2 = 0.009 \); Fig. 7A]. We next evaluated ICR as a function of delay time (Fig. 7B). A mixed-effects 2 \( \times \) 5 ANOVA found a significant main effect of delay time [\( F_{(4,44)} = 5.65; P = 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.297 \)] but no significant effect of midbrain FMT group [\( F_{(1,11)} = 0.21; P = 0.66, \eta^2 = 0.016 \)] or midbrain FMT \( \times \) delay interaction [\( F_{(4,44)} = 0.87; P = 0.49, \eta^2 = 0.045 \)]. We also evaluated Now bias (ICR) as a function of the delayed reward amount (Fig. 7C). A 2 \( \times \) 5 mixed-effects ANOVA found a significant main effect of Later amount [\( F_{(4,44)} = 5.01; P = 0.002, \eta^2 = 0.261 \)] but no significant main effect of midbrain FMT [\( F_{(1,11)} = 0.19; P = 0.67, \eta^2 = 0.014 \)]. We did, however, observe a nearly statistically significant medium-size midbrain FMT \( \times \) amount interaction [\( F_{(4,44)} = 2.58; P = 0.050, \eta^2 = 0.134 \)]. Note that sex was included as a covariate in this analysis and did not have a significant effect (\( P = 0.202 \)). Direct comparison of the slope and intercept terms of the logarithmic fit to each subject’s ICR by Later amount data found significantly steeper slopes in the Low midbrain FMT group [mean = \(-0.32 \pm 0.18\) relative to the High midbrain FMT group [mean = \(-0.14 \pm 0.10\); \( F_{(1,11)} = 5.75, P = 0.035, \eta^2 = 0.325 \)], while the intercepts showed no difference between midbrain FMT groups [Low midbrain FMT: mean = 0.93 \pm 0.33; High midbrain FMT: mean = 0.66 \pm 0.40; \( F_{(1,11)} = 0.41, P = 0.54, \eta^2 = 0.034 \)]. These results indicate greater sensitivity to increasing reward magnitude in those with lower DA synthesis capacity in the midbrain.

As for the Low and High putamen FMT group comparisons, when comparing Low and High midbrain FMT groups we observed no group differences in objective choice (CON) trial accuracy [\( F_{(1,11)} = 0.04, P = 0.85 \), response consistency [\( F_{(1,11)} = 0.001, P = 0.97 \), or RT in the objective choice (CON) \( F_{(1,11)} = 0.05, P = 0.83 \), or subjective choice [WANT: \( F_{(1,11)} = 0.01, P = 0.92 \); DON'T WANT: \( F_{(1,11)} = 0.33, P = 0.58 \)] trials, indicating that differences in these measures of response control do not explain the enhanced

![Fig. 5. Lower putamen FMT signal is specifically associated with more impulsive intertemporal choice, not greater inconsistency in intertemporal choices. A: covariate-adjusted \( \log_{10}k_q \) (impulsivity) by putamen FMT group. Less negative \( \log_{10}k_q \) values indicate more impulsive intertemporal choice at delay \( D = 0 \). \( \log_{10}k_q \) values differed significantly between groups [\( F_{(1,9)} = 10.59, *P = 0.01 \)]. B: covariate-adjusted \( q \) (consistency). Less negative \( q \) values indicate more consistent intertemporal choice across delay times. The average \( q \) value did not differ significantly between groups [\( F_{(1,9)} = 1.93, P = 0.198 \)]. Values reflect estimated marginal means \( \pm SE \). Conventions as for Fig. 3.](image-url)

![Fig. 6. Decreasing impatience (Diq) as a function of delay time. Diq is elevated in the Low putamen FMT group relative to the High putamen FMT group [\( F_{(1,9)} = 8.71, P = 0.016 \), while Diq declines as a function of delay in both groups, Diq declines more steeply in the Low putamen FMT group, indicating more irrational intertemporal choice. Conventions as for Fig. 3.](image-url)
sensitivity of Now/Later choice to reward magnitude associated with Low midbrain FMT $K_i$.

**Exploratory analyses of relationship between Now bias and FMT $K_i$ in caudate and ventral striatum.** In addition to the a priori analyses reported above, we conducted an exploratory investigation of the relationship between Now bias and FMT $K_i$ in the caudate and in the ventral striatum. In contrast to our findings in the putamen, we found no significant association between Now bias and FMT $K_i$ in either the bilateral ventral striatum ($\rho = -0.329$, $P = 0.213$; CI: $-0.725$, 0.163) or the bilateral caudate ($\rho = 0.182$, $P = 0.499$; CI: $-0.419$, 0.619). Furthermore, unlike our midbrain findings, we found no relationship between the slope of the ICR by delay reward amount (a measure of reward magnitude sensitivity) and FMT $K_i$ in either the ventral striatum ($\rho = 0.279$, $P = 0.295$; CI: $-0.256$, 0.715) or the caudate ($\rho = 0$, $P = 1$; CI: $-0.497$, 0.458). No other measure of Now bias (area under the curve, criterion interest rate, or log $k$) was significantly associated with FMT $K_i$ in the caudate or ventral striatum (min. $P = 0.362$).

**General findings.** Mean $K_i$ values for the bilateral putamen and midbrain were $0.024 \pm 0.001$ and $0.009 \pm 0.002$, respectively. Mean $K_i$ values for the bilateral caudate and ventral striatum were $0.019 \pm 0.002$ and $0.017 \pm 0.002$, respectively. As this study included both men and women over a range of ages (25–34 yr), it is important to consider whether either sex or age could have significantly contributed to our findings. We observed no significant differences between sexes in mean $K_i$ in any of our areas of interest (min. $P = 0.261$). Moreover, we found no significant correlation between age and $K_i$ in any of our areas of interest (min. $P = 0.582$). Thus sex and age are unlikely to be substantially impacting our findings. Finally, we note that in this small sample the trend toward COMT Val$^{158}$Met genotype to predict ICR did not reach statistical significance [$F_{(1,12)} = 2.627$, $P = 0.131$, $\eta^2 = 0.13$]; we did find a significant effect of COMT Val$^{158}$Met genotype on the closely related alternate measure of impulsive choice, $k_q$ [$F_{(1,9)} = 5.531$, $P = 0.043$, $\eta^2 = 0.22$], consistent with our prior findings in adults (Boettiger et al. 2007; Smith and Boettiger 2012).

**DISCUSSION**

Here we demonstrate that relatively low DA synthesis capacity in the putamen of healthy young adults is associated with elevated Now bias, more irrational discounting at short delay times, and strikingly higher criterion interest rates. In contrast, we found that lower DA synthesis capacity in the midbrain predicted greater sensitivity to increasing reward magnitude. These effects were over and above those explained by putative frontal DA, based on COMT genotype. These data suggest that individual differences in subcortical DA synthesis independently contribute to variation in intertemporal choice when controlling for COMT genotype.

**Impulsivity, dopamine, and the putamen.** As noted in the introduction, some existing evidence links variations in the putamen specifically to individual differences in Now bias during intertemporal choice tasks. First, in adult men with ADHD with or without cocaine dependence, the degree to which methylphenidate increased DA signaling in the putamen predicted the drug’s ability to decrease Now bias (Crunelle et al. 2013). Second, in a mixed population of control subjects and people with methamphetamine dependence, which included adults up to age 51 yr (the majority of whom were smokers), DA D$_2$/D$_3$ receptor binding in the whole striatum was inversely related to Now bias (Ballard et al. 2015). In examining striatal subdivisions, among the methamphetamine-dependent participants the putamen was the only subdivision that showed this relationship after accounting for effects of age. Age was in fact the strongest predictor of D$_2$/D$_3$ receptor binding, and effects of age and smoking may have occluded their ability to detect significant effects in the control subjects. Another recent PET paper examining temporal discounting in pathological gamblers and patients with Parkinson’s disease also included a small sample of control subjects, again with a very large age range [coefficient of variation (CV) >3 times larger than the age CV for our study], finding no significant relationships among control subjects but significant correlations between ventral striatal DA and Now bias among gamblers and between putamen DA and Now bias among Parkinson’s patients. Third, the degree to which tolcapone, a COMT inhibitor, increases activity in the putamen during Now/Later...
choices significantly correlated with decreased Now bias on tolcapone in healthy adults (Kayser et al. 2012). In addition, fMRI data collected during intertemporal choice suggests that the dorsal striatum is involved in integrating subjective valuation systems sensitive to reward delay and magnitude, providing an overall value metric to guide choice behavior (Pine et al. 2009). Beyond these specific relationships between DA, the putamen, and Now bias, other work has linked DA signaling in the putamen to other measures of impulsivity. For example, in adult men, higher trait impulsivity as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) scores negatively correlates with DAT availability in the dorsal striatum, particularly in the putamen (Costa et al. 2013). BIS scores also positively correlate with elevated amphetamine-induced striatal DA release in healthy adults (Buckholtz et al. 2010). In addition, nonhuman primates impairments in inhibitory control are correlated with increased gray matter in the putamen (Groman et al. 2013) as well as with decreased DA signaling in the putamen (Groman et al. 2011, 2012, 2013). Moreover, fMRI studies have reported evidence of delay time sensitivity in the putamen during both intertemporal choice (Wittmann et al. 2007) and a monetary incentive delay (MID) task incorporating rewards available at different delays (Luo et al. 2009). All of these data are consistent with the present finding that reduced presynaptic DA availability in the putamen is associated with greater impulsivity. Future work linking PET markers of putamen DA, fMRI during intertemporal choice, and pharmacological effects on Now bias in the same subjects is needed to establish the mechanistic linkage between each of these lines of evidence.

A key point is that the putamen DA synthesis effects we observed were present after controlling for COMT genotype effects, suggesting that low cortical DA tone and low presynaptic DA availability in the putamen make independent contributions to immediate reward selection bias. This result could reflect differing contributions of frontal DA and putamen DA to intertemporal choice. For example, we have previously reported hyperactivation in dorsal prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex during intertemporal choice associated with the COMT Val/Val genotype (Boettiger et al. 2007), which is reminiscent of activity associated with inefficiency in working memory function (Tunbridge et al. 2006). This finding, coupled with evidence for numerical distance comparisons in the posterior parietal lobe (Pinel et al. 2001), suggests that COMT genotype may confer differences in the capacity to hold numerical calculations in mind that allow for efficient comparisons of relative magnitude during intertemporal reward choice. In contrast, perhaps DA availability in the putamen plays a greater role in time perception, another cognitive process thought to contribute to the discounting of delayed rewards (Takahashi 2011; Wittmann and Paulus 2008). Human lesion studies show that processing of numerosity and of time duration are independent (Cappelletti et al. 2011). Moreover, Parkinson’s disease patients, who have deficits in DA signaling in the dorsal striatum, are selectively impaired in comparisons of duration but not of numerosity (Dormal et al. 2012). This latter finding is consistent with abundant evidence linking deficiencies in DA signaling with overestimation of time (see Merchant et al. 2013 for a recent review). While most work on timing has not explicitly distinguished between the caudate and the putamen, a recent pharmaco-fMRI study found that the effect of acute DA depletion on timing perception was specifically associated with a decrement in putamen activity when holding durations in mind (Coull et al. 2012). Alternatively, given evidence that the posterior putamen of primates is preferentially activated during automatic motor behaviors relative to nonroutine motor actions that require greater attention (Defains et al. 2010), reduced FMT in the putamen could alternatively lead to greater impulsivity via reduced attention to action. Indeed, reduced DA signaling in the primate putamen is associated with impaired flexibility in response selection, which could reflect a common attention to action deficit (Groman et al. 2011).

Finally, prior PET studies with FMT or the related radioligand L-3,4-dihydroxy-6-[18F]fluorophenylalanine (F-DOPA) interpret uptake of these tracers as an index of DA tone rather than phasic DA release (Braskie et al. 2011; Dreher et al. 2008; Kienast et al. 2008; Schlagenhauf et al. 2013; Siessmeier et al. 2006), a view further supported by combined F-DOPA and D_2/D_3 binding PET data from nonhuman primates (Doudet et al. 2004). According to this view, individuals with lower putamen FMT uptake in our study are more likely to release phasic DA bursts, which in turn favors more impulsive intertemporal choice.

Midbrain dopamine and impulsivity. In addition to the dorsal striatal findings described above, individual differences in trait impulsivity (as indexed by BIS scores) have also been associated with D_2/D_3 autoreceptor binding in the midbrain: diminished D_2/D_3 autoreceptor binding predicts greater impulsiveness (Buckholtz et al. 2010). Midbrain DA measures in humans have not previously been directly linked to DD, but data from animal models have shown that midbrain DA neurons are more active in response to higher-value rewards (Fiorillo et al. 2003; Roesch et al. 2007; Tobler et al. 2005), with Tobler and colleagues (2005) showing that the activity of midbrain DA neurons scales specifically with reward magnitude. In light of these data, our finding that relatively low midbrain DA synthesis capacity is associated with greater sensitivity to reward magnitude in an intertemporal reward choice task suggests two possible explanations. First, perhaps lower DA synthesis capacity in the midbrain neurons allows for a wider dynamic range of DA release in projection fields in response to rewards of different magnitudes. Alternatively, perhaps lower midbrain DA synthesis capacity reduces autoinhibition of midbrain DA neurons via somatodendritic DA release (Adell and Artigas 2004), which could also theoretically expand the dynamic range of DA neuron firing to differing reward magnitudes. Future studies using pharmacogenetic tools to precisely manipulate local vs. distal DA release will be needed to shed light on this issue. Alternatively, advances in dynamic pharmacopET imaging may allow disambiguation of these alternatives.

What about the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens? Some fMRI studies of intertemporal choice have implicated the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens (nAc) in impulsive choice (e.g., McClure et al. 2004), with some studies specifically linking nAc activation to delayed reward magnitude sensitivity (Ballard and Knutson 2009). Moreover, fMRI measures of sensitivity to reward and punishment in the ventral striatum positively correlate with separately evaluated Now bias (Hariri et al. 2006). As such, we might have expected to find that differences in DA synthesis capacity in the nAc accounted for some of the individual differences in either Now bias or reward...
magnitude sensitivity in the present data set. A possible explanation may be that the lumping of nAc core and shell regions, due to the low spatial resolution of PET, resulted in a canceling out of effects. This idea is supported from evidence in rodents that DA in the core and shell regions of the nAc have distinct functions. Specifically, DA D2 receptor blockade in the core and shell have opposing effects on impulsivity, with increasing impulsivity consequent to core blockade and decreasing impulsivity with shell blockade (Besson et al. 2010). Likewise, DA release in the nAc shell scales with reward magnitude (Beyene et al. 2010), and inactivating the nAc shell decreases preference for larger vs. smaller rewards (Stopper and Floresco 2011). Furthermore, a reward-predicting cue elicits increases in phasic DA release in both the nAc core and shell, but such DA increases are greater and more sustained in the shell (Cacciapaglia et al. 2012). Recent fMRI work in humans further supports the distinctions between reward encoding in the nAc core and shell (Baliki et al. 2013) and suggests that future high-resolution PET imaging that allows disambiguation of DA signaling in these regions in humans may prove informative.

Conclusions. We acknowledge some limitations of the present study. First, our sample size is rather modest, so although some effect sizes were rather large, these findings bear replicating. Second, we did not test female participants within a fixed window of the menstrual cycle, which could impact Now bias (Smith et al. 2014). However, this concern is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the FMT-PET measures used in these analyses may be downstream of the hormonal effects (Kritzer and Kohama 1998, 1999; Pasqualini et al. 1995; Shansky et al. 2003). Third, we did not control for alcohol use as a covariate, and although the majority of participants did not drink alcohol, this may bias comparisons of alcoholics with control subjects. Fourth, we did not test subjects with ADHD, ODD, or other psychiatric diagnoses that may bias comparisons of alcoholics with control subjects. Fifth, we did not test for the presence of a 5-HTTLPR 158Val/Val genotype, and thus we did not account for the impact of a 5-HTTLPR 158Val/Val genotype on impulsivity. Finally, our sample size is rather modest, so although some effect sizes were rather large, these findings bear replication. Nevertheless, the converging findings from human and preclinical studies provide support for the hypothesis that DA D2 receptor blockade in the core and shell have opposing effects on impulsivity, with increasing impulsivity consequent to core blockade and decreasing impulsivity with shell blockade (Besson et al. 2010).

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DISCLOSURES

No conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise, are declared by the author(s).

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS


REFERENCES


DOPAMINE, IMPULSIVITY, AND REWARD SENSITIVITY


